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Abstract. This paper studies the nature, the magnitude and the length of the
transition after a capital tax cut. The transition is analysed with adaptive learning,
under which agents do not need to adjust instantaneously to the change, as with rational
expectations (RE). Impulse response analysis reveals that the transition with learning is
asymmetrically sensitive to the nature of the exogenous technological shock at the time
of the reform. If the reform coincides with a negative shock, the transition to the new
steady state is slow, whereas, if it coincides with a positive shock, it is approximately the
same as the one predicted by RE. The results imply that cutting capital income taxes
before or during a recession may not be an eﬀective means for short-run ﬁscal stimulus.
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1. Introduction
There is by now a large literature arguing in favour of low tax rates on capital. In the
neoclassical growth model, the optimal long-run tax rate on capital is zero if the economy is
non-stochastic and approximately zero if the economy is stochastic. In practice, supply-side
reforms are designed to boost incentives to invest.1 Nevertheless, experience suggests that
such reforms take a long time to bring about the desired eﬀects. Recently, the set of tax cuts
introduced in the US in order to halt the growth decline of the economy, ignited a heated
debate on the appropriateness of the timing of the reform. Some believe that the tax cuts will
help the economy escape an imminent recession. Glenn Hubbard, chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers of the Bush administration, believes that “the terrorist attack [...] acted
as an adverse ‘supply shock’ to the economy. [...] The economy would beneﬁtf r o mt i m e l y
implementation of [the tax cuts].”2 G. W. Bush states that “If you want to get your way
out of recession, you provide tax relief.”3 Others are rather sceptical about the immediate
eﬀects of the reform. Richard Curtin, director of the University of Michigan’s Surveys of
Consumers, believes that “when you do cut taxes by substantial amounts, [...] some of it
∗Correspondence: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, Travessa Estêvão Pinto, Cam-
pus de Campolide, PT-1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: cgiannitsarou@fe.unl.pt. Tel: +351 21 380 16
00. Fax: +351 21 388 60 73. Web: http://www.fe.unl.pt/~chryssi
†I am grateful to Andrew Scott and Albert Marcet for extensive discussions and feedback on this project.
For comments and suggestions, I thank Seppo Honkapohja, Flavio Toxvaerd, John Driﬃll, Eva Carceles-
Poveda, an anonymous referee, as well as seminar participants at London Business School, Universidade Nova
de Lisboa, University of California Santa Barbara, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Université du Québec à
Montréal.
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will help the economy, but the timing of that help will be rather slow and the pace rather
sluggish [and] will prove to be a less eﬀective means of stimulating the economy than they
m i g h th a v eh o p e d . ” 4 At the other end, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle recently stated
that “Not only did the tax cut fail to prevent recession, [...] it probably made the recession
worse.”5
The lack of clear-cut answers to the issues related to the short-run eﬀects of tax cuts
suggests that there is a need for a better understanding of the transition dynamics. This
paper examines three key issues related to a cut of capital tax rates: (a) the nature and
the magnitude of the short-run eﬀects of such a reform, (b) the length of the transition
period and (c) the appropriate timing for such a reform. The novelty of the present work is
that it addresses these issues, by employing a hypothesis for analysing transitional dynamics
alternative to rational expectations (RE), namely adaptive learning.
One of the arguments in favour of RE is that a plausible learning/adaptive process
will ensure convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), i.e. that economic
agents eventually learn to form rational expectations. However, this argument is delicate
for analysing transition dynamics that come after policy changes, or, in general, any kind
of large structural shifts. This is because, in the early periods, the agents have no or very
little information on the eﬀects of such changes. Arguably, adaptive learning provides a
more plausible approximation of an economy in transition than RE. The adjustment of the
expectations formation takes place gradually, based on reasonable estimates derived from
the new information received after the reform is implemented.
The analysis consists of studying the eﬀects of an unanticipated and permanent elimina-
tion of capital income taxation in two economies that are identical in all respects, apart from
the way the agents form expectations about future variables. The ﬁrst economy consists
of agents that are rational. The second economy consists of agents that can be viewed as
econometricians who form expectations using least squares estimates. I will refer to these
agents as learners. The model describing the economies follows the standard lines of the real
business cycle framework and it ensures that the focus remains on the comparison of the
transitions with RE and adaptive learning.
I ﬁnd that under adaptive learning, the transition can be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
one predicted by RE. The diﬀerences between the transitions are related to the timing of the
tax reform. Impulse response analysis under adaptive learning reveals that: (a) the nature
and the magnitude of the short-run eﬀects depend on the exogenous technological shock
at the time when the reform is implemented and on the state of the economy prior to the
reform. Speciﬁcally, when the reform coincides with a negative shock and/or a low level of
capital stock, production falls below the pre-reform steady state for a long time before it
starts growing towards the higher post-reform steady state (while RE predicts an immediate
increase). If, however, it coincides with a positive shock, the transition with learning is
approximately the same as the one predicted by RE. (b) The speeds of convergence to the
post-reform steady state also depend on the initial realisation of the technological shock
and on the pre-reform state of the economy. When the shock is negative, adjustment is
signiﬁcantly slower under learning than under RE. This eﬀect is magniﬁed if the capital stock
4Interview for BBC’s World Business Report, 5/10/2001.
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at the time of the reform is below its original steady state level. As the shock increases, the
impulses for both economies converge to the new steady state with approximately the same
speed.
The ﬁndings have a simple intuition. When agents learn, their expectations about future
returns on investment, and hence their decisions about consumption, are only based on the
limited information they presently have. Therefore, a series of negative shocks prevents
the agents from interpreting the eﬀects of the reform as a change towards a higher steady
state. If, however, the agents are rational, they realise immediately after the reform that
the new tax rates imply higher future returns, whatever shocks the economy is subjected
to. Their expectations and their consumption decisions adjust accordingly, thus resulting in
fast convergence to the new steady state. The economy thus escapes the recession. These
results support the sceptics’ arguments. I.e. that indeed, the beneﬁts of supply-side reforms
accrue in the long run and that such kind of reforms may not be an eﬀective instrument for
short-run ﬁscal stimulus.
This paper is related and partly motivated by a large research program that was initiated
by Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Chamley (1981) and Summers (1981), who show that an
elimination of capital income taxes would have very substantial positive economic eﬀects.
Working on variations of the same non-stochastic framework, Judd (1985a), (1985b) and
(1987), Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) found that reducing capital taxes has signiﬁcant
welfare gains. Subsequently, this result was found to be robust in possibly stochastic envi-
ronments (Zhu (1992), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1994)). According to this literature, the optimal ﬁscal policy dictates a large capital tax
rate in early periods and a decrease of the tax rate once the government has suﬃciently high
savings. However, this kind of policy is problematic in terms of implementability, since it is
highly time-inconsistent. Because of this issue, several authors have turned to studies with
constant tax rates. Finally, although a lot of the work in this area of research focuses on
long-run optimal ﬁscal policies, some authors have explicitly addressed the transition after
lowering capital income taxes or substituting with other forms of less distortionary taxation
(Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), Chari et al. (1994), Garcia-Milà, Marcet and
Ventura (1995) and Mendoza and Tesar (1998)). In these studies, when calculating welfare
gains from low taxes on capital, the authors incorporate the transition period.
2. Description of the Model
The economy to be studied is described by a simple neoclassical growth model with uncer-
tainty. It consists of a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived households, an inﬁnitely lived
ﬁrm and a government that ﬁnances its expenditures by levying taxes on capital and labour
income. The source of uncertainty in the economy is an exogenous stochastic shock Zt to
the technology. The households are endowed with some capital, and receive income from
renting out their capital and supplying labour. Income is used to ﬁnance consumption and
invest in additional capital. Income from capital and labour is taxed at constant rates τ and
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over consumption Ct,l e i s u r eLt, capital Kt and investment It, subject to the budget con-
straint
Ct + Kt − Kt−1 =( 1− τ)(Rt − δ)Kt−1 +( 1− ξ)WtNt (2)
where Nt ≡ 1 − Lt denotes hours worked and the evolution of capital is determined by
Kt =( 1− δ)Kt−1 + It,w h e r eRt,W t denote the price of capital rental and the wage rate
respectively. The parameters β and δ denote the discount factor and the depreciation rate of
capital respectively. Taxes on capital are after depreciation allowances. The representative
ﬁrm produces output Yt, rents capital, hires eﬃciency units of labour at a rate Wt,a n d
maximises proﬁts Yt − WtNt − RtKt−1 in every period, subject to a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function Yt = ZtKα
t−1N1−α
t , 0 <α<1, and to a technological shock, which evolves
according to logZt = ρlogZt−1 + εt,ε t ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) and 0 <ρ<1. Finally, the government
has expenditures Gt that are ﬁnanced by levying taxes on capital and labour income, and
maintains a balanced budget6
Gt = τ(Rt − δ)Kt−1 + ξWtNt (3)
The competitive (RE) equilibrium for the economy is deﬁned as a sequence of prices and
allocations, a government policy {τ,ξ} and a sequence of government expenditures such that
when households maximise utility and ﬁrms maximise proﬁts taking prices and government
policy as given, the chosen allocations are such that capital, labour and goods markets clear,
and the government budget constraint is satisﬁed. The equilibrium can be summarised by
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(4)
ACt =( 1 − ξ)Wt (5)
Kt−1Rt = αYt (6)
WtNt =( 1 − α)Yt (7)
Ct + Kt = Yt +( 1− δ)Kt−1 − Gt (8)




logZt = ρlogZt−1 + εt,ε t ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) (11)
Since the aim of the paper is to quantify the diﬀerences of the transitions of a capital tax
reform under RE and adaptive learning, this standard model facilitates comparisons and it
also conforms with some of the related literature on supply-side economics (e.g. Chamley
(1986) and Cooley and Hansen (1992)).
6Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) show that certain balanced-budget rules may lead to indeterminacies
in a model very similar to the present one. Their ﬁndings suggest that endogenous labour tax rates are
important for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria. Therefore I model the ﬁscal policy so that such
indeterminacies are not present, i.e. with ﬁxed income tax rates and endogenous government expenditures.
However, letting e Gt + TRt = Gt, where {e Gt} is an exogenous sequence of government expenditures and
{TR t} is a sequence of endogenous lump-sum transfers, (3) is consistent with a balanced budget of the form
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3. Rational Expectations and Adaptive Learning
To solve the model I use the method of log-linearising around the steady state.7 Let ¯ P denote
the steady state value of variable Pt and let pt ≡ logPt − log ¯ P. The set of log-linearised
equations that determines an REE is
0=Et [ct − ct+1 +( 1− β + βδ(1 − τ))rt+1] (12)














rt = zt − (1 − α)kt−1 +( 1− α)nt (15)
yt = zt + αkt−1 +( 1− α)nt (16)
wt = zt + αkt−1 − αnt (17)
gt =
τ ¯ R ¯ K
¯ G




ξ ¯ W ¯ L
¯ G
(wt + nt) (18)
By eliminating all variables apart from k and z in the ﬁrst (expectational) equation, one can
write the model in the reduced form
kt = a1Etkt+1 + a2kt−1 + bzt (19)
zt = ρzt−1 + εt (20)
where the coeﬃcients a1,a 2 and b depend on the parameters of the model.8 Let xt =( kt,z t)0.
The REE of (19) is a minimal state variable (or fundamental) solution kt = ¯ Φ0xt−1 + θεt ≡
¯ φ1kt−1 + ¯ φ2zt−1 + θεt. Inserting this into (19), yields two solutions ¯ Φ+ and ¯ Φ−:
¯ Φ+,− =












1 − a1(ρ + ¯ φ1)
¶0
(21)
It can be shown that when |a1 + a2| < 1, the only stationary solution is ¯ Φ−.F o ra1 and a2
such that |a1 + a2| > 1 and |a1a2| < 1/4, both solutions are stationary. For the remaining
combinations of a1 and a2, both solutions are either non-stationary or non-real. I restrict
attention to the stationary solutions.
I now relax the assumption of RE and assume that the households form expectations
according to
E∗
t kt+1 = φ1tkt + φ2tzt (22)
and estimate the vector of coeﬃcients Φt in every period by using the available data and
the observed forecasting error. The diﬀerence between (22) and rational expectations for-
mation is that in (22) the conditional expectations do not coincide with the mathematical
7This also facilitates the analysis under adaptive learning. Although there have been some contributions
for directly analysing non-linear models with adaptive learning (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001)), the
literature still lacks a general treatment of non-linear learning dynamics. This is because the bulk of the
results developed for economics based on stochastic approximation theory require that the evolution of the
state variable is conditionally linear, which is not the case for the state variables in real business cycle models.
8Explicit expressions for the steady state and the coeﬃcients are provided in Appendix A. The calculation
of the coeﬃcients in the reduced form of the log-linearised model were done using Mathematica 3.0.6 C. Giannitsarou
expectations implied by the probability distributions governing the structure of the econ-
omy. Rational agents are assumed to know the structure and the parameters of the model.
Therefore their expectations are ‘correct’, in the sense that, if at time t agents expect capital
at t +1to be Etkt+1 = ¯ φ1kt + ¯ φ2zt, their expectation will be conﬁrmed on average. In
the same sense, learners do not form ‘correct’ expectations since, in general, they have less
information than the rational agents. Implicit in the expectations formation (22) is that the
learners are aware of how the evolution of the state variable relates to the evolution of the
rest of the variables, but they are not aware of the true law of motion of the state variable.
In a nutshell, the rational agents foresee while the learners forecast.9
Substituting the perceived law of motion (22) into the reduced form (19) implies an actual
law of motion of capital
kt = T(Φt−1)0xt−1 + V (Φt−1)εt (23)
where T(Φ) ≡ (T1(Φ),T 2(Φ))0 =
³
(1 − a1φ1)
−1 a2 , (1 − a1φ1)




−1 (a1φ2 + b). The agents are assumed to update Φ using the following recursive
least squares algorithm
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t−1 (T(Φt−1) − Φt−1)+V (Φt−1)εt is the forecasting error in period t, St is the second
moment matrix estimate and the gain γt is a deterministic positive decreasing sequence such
that
P∞
t=0 γt = ∞ and
P∞
t=0 γ2
t < ∞. Under this speciﬁcation, it can be shown that an
REE ¯ Φ of the reduced form model (19) is stable under the recursive least squares learning
algorithm (24), i.e. the algorithm converges locally and asymptotically to ¯ Φ with some
positive probability which is bounded from below by a sequence of numbers tending to one,
if the following conditions are satisﬁed
a1a2
¡
1 − a1¯ φ1
¢2 < 1 and
ρa1
1 − a1¯ φ1
< 1 (25)
This result ensures that, if (25) hold and as more information becomes available, the learners
will eventually learn how to form rational expectations, with a large probability.10 The re-
duced form model (19) is studied in Giannitsarou (2003a) and (2003b). It is shown that, for
9Other formulations for the expectations formation are possible as well. For example, Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) consider a case where agents also learn about the relationship of capital with consumption. This
introduces some technical complications for the analysis of real-time adaptive learning. For this reason, and
since, strictly speaking, consumption is not a state variable it is not necessary to include it in the reduced
form of the model. Moreover, one can consider scenarios where (22) includes a constant term, or agents also
forecast the technological shock as well as the state variable. In both these cases learners have a smaller
information set than the one assumed here. In this sense, the learners that form expectations according to
(22) are the closest possible to the rational agents. The results presented in later sections, based on (22),
do not diﬀer qualitatively from the ones under these two alternative formulations. For the former and for all
reasonable calibrations of the model, the results remain unchanged both asymptotically and in the short-run
apart from the shift induced by the intercept. For the latter speciﬁcation, the eﬀects discussed later are
slightly magniﬁed in the very early periods of the model, but it can easily be veriﬁed that learning about the
parameters of the technology shock can be achieved very fast and therefore the results are not signiﬁcantly
altered.
10This result derives as a direct application of the results of Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and
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certain parameter regions, the stability of the REEs under learning is sensitive to the spec-
iﬁcation of the learning algorithm and the assumption of heterogeneous learning. However,
if the parameters of the model are such that |a1 + a2| < 1, the unique stationary solution
¯ Φ− is always learnable under least squares learning, stochastic gradient learning and under
heterogeneous learning.
The reform to be analysed is one in which the government implements a permanent
unanticipated reduction of the tax rate on capital at time t =0from τold to τnew.11 To
study the tax reform under adaptive learning, I assume that before the reform, the economy
has already converged to the (old) equilibrium. A gain sequence of the form γt =1 /(t + N)
is used in the least squares algorithm, where N =4 0 , corresponding to ten years.12 The
initial value for the technological shock is set to z−1 =0 . The numerical simulation of the RE
transition path consists of the following steps: (a) calculate the old and new steady states, (b)
log-linearise around the new steady state and ﬁnding the coeﬃcient ¯ Φnew, (c) set the initial
condition for capital, (d) simulate the transition of kt and (e) use the generated series for
capital to simulate the rest of the variables. The process for simulating the path for learning
is characterised by a crucial diﬀerence. Apart from the initial condition for capital, which is
the same as for the RE case, the agents must now have an initial perception about Φ. Since
Ih a v ea s s u m e dt h a tb e f o r et h er e f o r mt h ea g e n t sh a v el e a r n e dt h ep r e - r e f o r me q u i l i b r i u m ,




The set of parameters to be speciﬁed is {α,δ,β,ρ,σε,ξ,τ}. Since the emphasis is put on
the properties of the REEs for diﬀerent values of the ﬁscal parameters τ and ξ,Iﬁx A =2 .54,
α =0 .36,δ=0 .025,β=0 .99, ρ =0 .95 and σε =0 .00712, and let τ and ξ vary in the range
[0,1). The parameter A is set such that in steady state, the households spend one third of
their time working. The values for α, δ, β, ρ, and σε are chosen such that they conform with
the majority of the real business cycle literature. For the above parameterisation and for all
τ,ξ ∈ [0,1) i tc a ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a t0 <a 1 + a2 < 1 (derivation omitted). Hence ¯ Φ− is
the unique stationary and learnable solution. Furthermore, I set τold =0 .4 and ξ =0 .25.
These values correspond to averages of the capital and labour tax rates estimates provided
by Mendoza et al. (1994) for the US economy for the period 1965 - 1996.13 The implied
11The present analysis is in the spirit of Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Mendoza and Tesar
(1998), and is limited to changes in time-invariant tax rates, thus the tax cut is assumed to be unanticipated.
Some of Cooley and Hansen’s results indicate that under RE, little changes if the tax rates are taken to be
time-varying. Nevertheless, it is an open question how changing this assumption would aﬀect the analysis
with learning. On one hand, one could argue that since learners do not have any information/data about the
new regime until a reform is undertaken, it should make no diﬀerence whether the reform is anticipated or
not. On the other hand, if they anticipate tax cuts, it could be argued that they adjust their forecasting rules
so as to treat the tax rates as time-varying parameters; in this case the technical analysis of learning would
diﬀer from the present one.
12Technically, this kind of gain sequence reduces the large variability of the estimates in the early periods,
that results from OLS regressions with very few data points, and therefore reduces the probability of the
estimates leaving the domain of attraction of ¯ Φ. Another way to increase the probability of convergence to
the REE is to augment the learning algorithm with a projection facility, which prevents the estimates Φt from
leaving the interior of a subset of the domain of attraction of ¯ Φ. A learning algorithm with a projection facility
ensures almost sure local asymptotic convergence to the REE (see Marcet and Sargent (1989)). However, the
projection facility has occasionally been criticised (e.g. Grandmont (1998)), and has thus been avoided in the
present analysis.
13Other authors have used similar estimates. Lucas (1990) uses ξ =0 .4 and τ =0 .36,C o o l e ya n dH a n s e n8 C. Giannitsarou
long-term output ratios for the pre-reform economy are ¯ K/¯ Y =8 .61 (implying annual ratio
2.15), ¯ I/¯ Y =0 .21 and ¯ G/¯ Y =0 .21. These ratios are within a reasonable range of reported
ratios for US data, apart from the investment-output ratio which is slightly higher than
the usual estimates.14 The transition to be analysed is after a complete elimination of
capital taxation, hence τnew =0 . The deterministic steady states of the variables before and
after the reform are shown in table 1. The numbers conﬁrm the standard predictions of
supply-side economics. The long run eﬀects of eliminating capital income taxation are large:
when the capital tax rate is set to zero, capital stock and investment are about 28% higher,
consumption is about 10% higher and hours worked are about 2% lower. Finally, the pre-
and post-reform RE solutions are ¯ Φold =( 0 .9577,0.1220)0 and ¯ Φnew =( 0 .9418,0.1389)0.
4. Transition Dynamics of a Capital Tax Reform
Standard impulse response analysis consists of tracing the eﬀect of a 1% change in the
variable/parameter of interest on the rest of the variables. This eﬀect is isolated by assuming
that the variables are at steady state levels prior to the change. The choice of a 1% change
is a normalisation that facilitates comparison between the eﬀects of such changes in diﬀerent
models. This type of analysis is suﬃcient under RE, since the impulse response functions
(IRFs) depend linearly on the state and the exogenous variables, and thus represent shifts
and/or symmetric reﬂections of the standardised response to a 1% positive change. However,
this is not true when agents learn adaptively. Consider for example a generic setup where
the endogenous variable p evolves according to pt = γ1,t−1st + γ2,t−1υt,w h e r es and υ are
the state variable and an exogenous variable respectively. There are two possible eﬀects that
one might wish to identify, namely the eﬀect of a shock to the exogenous variable υ and the
eﬀect of a structural shift in the economy. Assuming that the shock occurs at t =0 , when
agents are rational, they instantaneously recognise the ‘correct’ coeﬃcients γ1t and γ2t and
therefore the coeﬃcients are constant for all t. But when agents learn, γ1t and γ2t are in
general non-linear functions of time, the initial values of the state and exogenous variables,
and the initial perceptions γ1,0 and γ2,0. Thus, a standard impulse response analysis cannot
trace asymmetries that arise due to these non-linearities. A full impulse response analysis
would include tracing the eﬀects of all possible combinations of shocks and variables that
determine the evolution of the coeﬃcients γ1t and γ2t, i.e. shocks to the exogenous variable,
the parameters and the initial perceptions of the agents about the state variable and γ1t and
γ2t. Here, I restrict attention to the eﬀects of the supply-side reform when this coincides
with (a) a shock to the technology and (b) various levels of the pre-reform capital stock. An
emphasis is put on scenarios where the tax reform coincides with negative exogenous shocks
and/or a low pre-reform capital stock, as it is typical for ﬁscal policy makers to introduce
(1992) use τ =0 .5 and ξ =0 .23, and Mendoza and Tesar (1998) use ξ =0 .291 and τ =0 .415 (based on 1991
estimates from Mendoza et al., (1994)).
14For US data, Lucas (1990) reports K/Y =2 .4 (annual) and G/Y =0 .21; Maddison (1992) reports
K/Y ∈ [2.12,2.43] (depending on the period considered); Mendoza and Tesar (1998) report I/Y =0 .17 and
G/Y =0 .19; Ventura (1999) reports annual K/Y =2 .89; Ahmed and Rogers (2000) report I/Y ∈ [0.14,0.23]
and G/Y ∈ [0.12,0.22] (depending on the period considered). Furthermore, based on quarterly data for
the period 1959 - 2001, I have calculated I/Y =0 .18 and G/Y =0 .19 (source OECD, Quarterly National
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reforms when a recessionary phase of the economy is imminent.15
As a benchmark, I summarise the impulse response analysis with RE. IRFs isolating
solely the eﬀect of the change in the capital tax rate are consistent with the ﬁndings of
existing literature (e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Mendoza and Tesar (1998), for the
closed economy case). I ﬁnd that on impact, as capital starts accumulating towards the new
steady state, the agents have incentives to consume less and work more (in order to invest and
accumulate more capital). Hence labour initially overshoots while consumption undershoots.
Then, labour gradually settles at a lower steady state, while consumption settles at a higher
steady state.
4.1. The Eﬀect of the Shock to Technology. Figure 1 presents IRFs for capital and
output for three diﬀerent values of the shock to technology. The vertical and the horizontal
axes represent percentage deviations from the post-reform steady state values of the variables
and years after the reform respectively. The solid lines correspond to the responses of the
economy of learners and the dashed ones to the responses of the economy of rational agents.
The dotted horizontal lines correspond to the pre-reform steady states of the variables. The
middle plots depict responses solely due to the change in τ (ε0 =0and K−1 = ¯ Kold). The
left hand side plots are the responses coinciding with a negative shock, ε0 = −0.03,a n d
the right hand side plots show the responses coinciding with a positive shock, ε0 =0 .03.
Given the standard deviation σε =0 .00712, shocks in the range [−0.03,0.03] cover 99% of
the probability mass and the IRFs within this range vary smoothly as functions of the shock.
The sensitivity of the variables to the technological shock becomes clear from these plots.
When the shock is negative, the IRFs with learning diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the responses
with RE. As the shock becomes larger these diﬀerences are smoothed out, indicating that the
impulse responses with learning exhibit asymmetries with respect to shocks to the technology.
To see why these asymmetries are present, consider the ﬁrst period after the reform (t =1 ).
The learners’ forecast about the evolution of capital is solely based on past perceptions
about the coeﬃcients and does not incorporate the change in τ, whereas the rational agents
instantaneously calculate ¯ Φnew. Using (23), the impulse response for capital with learning is
k1 = T1(φ1,0)k0 + V (Φ0)ε0. Given the parameterisation, the function T1(·) that maps the
perceived to the actual elasticity of capital is increasing. This implies that the higher φ1 is
perceived to be, the slower capital adjusts towards the new steady state. Therefore, since
¯ φ
old
1 > ¯ φ
new
1 , and given that kAL
−1 = kRE
−1 , in period t =0capital will adjust to a higher level
with RE than with learning. A period later, at t =1 , the actual realisation of capital with
learning is determined by the estimate Φ0,f o r m e da tt =0using







−1 (T(Φ−1) − Φ−1)+V (Φ−1)ε0
¤
(26)
Hence, the actual realisation k1 depends on how the estimates Φ adjust. Consider the ﬁrst
row of Ã
k2
−1(T1(¯ Φold) − ¯ φ
old
1 )+k−1z−1(T2(¯ Φold) − ¯ φ
old
2 )+k−1V (¯ Φold)ε0
k−1z−1(T1(¯ Φold) − ¯ φ
old
1 )+z2
−1(T2(¯ Φold) − ¯ φ
old
2 )+z−1V (¯ Φold)ε0
!
(27)
15The computational analysis in the sections that follow was done using a set of codes in Matlab 5.3. The
full toolbox is available upon request. For various early calculations, Uhlig’s (1999) toolkit was employed.
The author acknowledges Harald Uhlig for making his programs available.10 C. Giannitsarou
The estimate Φ0 linearly on ε0. It can be shown that there exists a value e ε such that if
ε0 < e ε<0, the estimate φ1,0 adjusts upwards, in the opposite direction of where it should
adjust to. Moreover, there exists a value b ε such that if 0 < b ε<ε 0, the estimate φ1,0 adjusts
downwards, to a level below the REE ¯ φ1. For all plausible values of initial capital stock,
e ε is very near zero and b ε is approximately 0.023 (large relative to the standard deviation
σε =0 .00712). In other words, any shock ε0 < 0.023 implies a slow-down of the adjustment
of capital, as compared to the response of capital under RE. The smaller the shock is, the
slower capital adjusts, and in particular, whent h es h o c ki sn e g a t i v e ,t h er a t eo fa d j u s t m e n t
is even slower than under the pre-reform regime. This means that a bad shock coinciding
with the tax cut sends out a ‘false alarm’ to the agents, making them believe that under the
new regime, capital is more inelastic than under the old regime, and therefore it accumulates
very slowly. Since the actual evolution of capital depends on agents’ expectations about
it, this eﬀect remains for some time until the forecasting error becomes smaller and the
agents start forming RE. In contrast, a positive shock enables the agents to adjust their
expectations towards the REE faster, as it sends the least squares estimate of Φ in the right
direction. In extreme cases of large positive shocks, not only do the agents realise that the
economy is moving towards a higher steady state, but the extreme optimism results in capital
accumulating even faster than under RE.
These eﬀects are transmitted in a natural manner to the rest of the variables. Although
qualitatively similar to the corresponding responses under RE, the slower accumulation of
capital results in somewhat smoother reactions of the variables to the change of the capital
tax rate. The slow capital accumulation for the learners gives them less incentive to invest.
T h e r e f o r et h ee a r l yd r o pi nc o n s u m p t i o na n di n c r e a s ei nl a b o u ra r es m a l l e rt h a nw i t hR E .I n
eﬀect, lower labour supply combined with slow capital accumulation and bad productivity
shocks, results in a recessionary episode in production that lasts approximately 3.5 years
before output starts to rise above the pre-reform steady state.16 When a large positive shock
is realised, production in the economy of learners overshoots in the early periods to a level
that is marginally higher than the one under rational expectations.
4.2. The Eﬀect of the Initial Capital Stock. Further asymmetries in the IRFs with
learning arise as a result of varying the level of the pre-reform capital stock. With arguments
similar to those in section 4.1, it can be shown that if ε0 < 0, the deviation of the estimates
from the equilibrium ¯ Φnew is decreasing in both the shock ε0 and the initial (pre-reform)
capital stock k−1. I.e. the smaller the shock is or the lower the level of the capital stock,
the further away the estimates Φ deviate from the equilibrium. Furthermore, this deviation
has the property of increasing diﬀerences, i.e. if the reform coincides with a negative shock
to the technology and the capital stock is at a low level, one eﬀect reinforces the other in
that the adjustment of capital is slower than if the two isolated eﬀects were to be added
together. Thus the pessimism in the agents’ expectations about the evolution of capital
when the economy is subjected to a negative shock is magniﬁed if the economy is already in
16Note that the kinks in the impulse response functions of output with adaptive learning appear because
in period t =0output depends on post-reform parameters (coeﬃcients a1,a 2 and b of the reduced form) and
on the pre-reform beliefs Φ−1. It is only from period t =1that the new ﬁscal regime is fully incorporated in
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a recessionary phase. This can be veriﬁed by the IRFs of capital and output in ﬁgure 2.17
4.3. Speeds of Convergence. It has already become clear that the variables of the two
economies with adaptive learning and RE do not converge to the new steady state with the
same speed. Speciﬁcally, ﬁgures 1 and 2 indicate that convergence takes longer with adaptive
learning, when the impulse responses are plotted for negative shocks. To quantify this eﬀect
better, I provide numerical estimates of the speeds of convergence for shocks producing
impulse responses in the range ε0 ∈ [−0.03,0.03], when K−1 is at the pre-reform steady
state. I deﬁne the speed of convergence to the new steady state of the impulse response of
av a r i a b l ep to a shock ε0, a st h et i m ep e r i o dt∗(ε0,p) such that
t∗(ε0,p)=m i n {t :
° °pt(ε0)
° ° =0 } (28)
where pt(ε0) is the vector (pt(ε0),p t+1(ε0),p t+2(ε0),...). I.e., the speed of convergence is the
earliest period such that the variable does not deviate from the new steady state from that
period and on. For the numerical estimation of the speeds of convergence, I use a stopping
criterion with tolerance 0.0004, corresponding approximately to 5% of the standard deviation
of εt. The relevant speeds of convergence for capital and output are presented in ﬁgure 3. In
each plot the horizontal axis represents the size of the shock producing the impulse response
and the vertical axis represents the period in years where convergence of the variable is
achieved. The solid lines represent the speeds of the variables with adaptive learning and
the dashed lines the speeds with RE.
It now becomes clear how negative shocks coinciding with the tax reform dramatically
slow down the convergence of the variables to the new steady state when adaptive learning is
employed. The diﬀerence between the speeds of convergence can be up to twenty years for a
shock ε0 = −0.03. For large positive shocks however, responses with both methods converge
with almost the same speed. Similar plots for the same range of shocks and initial value
of capital 20% below the original steady state (not included here) reveal that the impulse
responses under RE remain unaltered, while under adaptive learning, convergence is even
slower for negative shocks, conﬁrming the observations of section 4.2.
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis. To test the robustness of the results, I repeat the impulse
response analysis for two variations of the model. First, I consider a model where the tax
revenue from capital income is substituted by revenue from taxes on labour income, i.e.
ξnew =0 .3405 is determined by requiring that ¯ Gnew/¯ Y new = ¯ Gold/¯ Y old (case (a)). Second I
consider a model where the supply of labour is inelastic, i.e. Nt =1for all t (case (b)). Iw i l l
refer to the original case as the benchmark case. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of
capital for the benchmark case and cases (a) and (b) for the scenarios {ε0 =0 ,K −1 = ¯ Kold},
{ε0 = −0.03,K −1 = ¯ Kold} and {ε0 =0 ,K −1 =2 0 %below ¯ Kold}.18 The corresponding
REEs for the three cases are presented in table 2. In case (a) the labour income tax rate
increases, thus the steady state level of labour supply will be lower than in the benchmark
case. The same is true for production, capital, consumption and investment. As expected,
the diﬀerences between the IRFs of the benchmark case and case (a) are not signiﬁcant. In
17Figure 2 should be read in the same way as ﬁgure 1.
18The graphs should be read in the same way as in ﬁg u r e s1a n d2 .12 C. Giannitsarou
case (b), the post-reform increases in the steady state values of the variables are larger than
in the benchmark case. Furthermore, ¯ φ1 is large, resulting in a slower adjustment of capital
under learning. This is because when labour is inelastic, the agents respond to a margin
less than in the benchmark case. For this reason, the impulses with learning are also more
sensitive to negative shocks and low initial capital, and the diﬀerences between the impulses
for learning and RE are larger relative to the benchmark case. Nevertheless, although the
eﬀects are somewhat magniﬁed, the results are qualitatively robust to this variation of the
model. Finally, impulse response analysis for reforms where the capital income tax rate is
reduced to some positive rate, instead of being eliminated, reveals that the eﬀects described
in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are qualitatively the same as in the benchmark case. Recall however
that all the analyses are based on percentage deviations from the post-reform steady state,
and therefore the magnitude of the eﬀects on the levels of the variables is smaller when the
tax cut is smaller.
5. Welfare
In order to analyse the implications of the diﬀerences between learning and RE for welfare,
Iu s eam o d i ﬁed version of the standard welfare measure. The commonly used measure is
the percentage amount by which consumption should change in all periods in the pre-reform
economy so that agents are as well oﬀ as in the post reform economy (including the transition)
leaving leisure unchanged.19 To capture possible asymmetries arising in the welfare gains
with adaptive learning, I modify this deﬁnition by calculating welfare gains conditional on
the initial random shock to technology. I.e., given an arbitrary initial shock ε, the conditional
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Figure 5 displays the conditional welfare gains for adaptive learning and RE as functions
of ε0 ∈ [−0.03,0.03], based on simulations of length T =2 ,000 periods. It is evident from
this plot that for the economy of learners, ω(ε0) is a non-linear function. For all ε0 < b ε
the gains of learners are smaller than the gains of rational agents, and this diﬀerence is
increasingly larger, the smaller ε0 is. For ε0 = b ε the gains are equal and for ε0 > b ε the
gains with learning are marginally larger. The plotted welfare gains are consistent with the
ﬁndings of the previous section: learners are in general less better oﬀ than rational agents,
unless they observe very good ‘news’ when the reform is implemented. In particular, they are
increasingly less better oﬀ than the rational agents, the worse the news is. It should be noted
however, that these diﬀerences between the welfare gains of rational agents and learners are
not very large. For the extreme realisation of ε0 = −0.03 the diﬀerence is approximately
0.45 percentage points.
19This measure has been used by Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), Chari et al. (1994) and Garcia-
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6. Discussion and Policy Implications
It is evident from the impulse response analysis that there are two key factors that deter-
mine the transition of the variables after an elimination of capital income taxes: (a) the
state of the economy and (b) the sign and size of the exogenous shocks at the time of the
implementation of the reform. As an illustration, I simulate the evolution of the output
levels with and without a supply-side reform for two realisations of the exogenous random
shocks. For the ﬁrst realisation, which I call recessionary shocks, the economy is subjected
to consecutive negative shocks in the ﬁrst two quarters after the reform takes place. For the
second realisation, which I call expansionary shocks, the economy is subjected to consecutive
positive shocks in the ﬁrst two quarters after the reform. For the remaining quarters, the
realisations of all random errors are the same. What emerges from this exercise reinforces the
ﬁndings of the impulse response analysis. When the reform coincides with bad shocks to the
economy (ﬁgure 6), the learners fail to interpret it as a change towards a higher steady state,
and as a result the economy falls into a recession. On the other hand, despite the negative
shocks, the economy of rational agents escapes the recession. If there had been no reform,
output would evolve in the same way both under RE and under learning, since it has been
assumed that learning has already converged to the REE. Although the magnitude of the
recession is somewhat reduced for the economy of learners when the tax cuts are introduced,
the evolution of output stays closer to the corresponding ‘no-reform’ series than to the RE
series for at least the ﬁrst three years. Furthermore, when the reform coincides with good
shocks to the economy (ﬁgure 7) the learners’ expectations ‘become’ rational very fast, and
therefore the beneﬁts of the reform are immediate. Interestingly, output in the economy of
learners is marginally higher than output in the economy of rational agents for some time
after the reform.
The results are driven by two factors, the adjustment inertia of the learners and the
self-referential nature of the model. When agents learn, their expectations about future
net returns on investment, and hence their decisions about consumption, are based on the
information they currently have. Because in the early periods after the reform agents have
no or very little information about the eﬀects of the new regime, they interpret shocks to the
economy as ﬂuctuations around the pre-reform steady state (adjustment inertia). Moreover,
since their expectations inﬂuence the true evolution of the economy, ‘good’ shocks boost the
optimism of the agents so that they ﬁnd the new and better steady state fast; ‘bad’ shocks
on the other hand, keep the economy far away from the higher steady state for a long time,
since the agents’ pessimistic expectations, and therefore decisions, do not allow the economy
to grow (self-referential nature of the model). In contrast, rational agents, who have perfect
foresight (i.e. no adjustment inertia) realise immediately after the reform that the new tax
rates imply higher future returns whatever shocks the economy is currently subjected to.
In practice, supply-side reforms, and in particular capital tax cuts, are designed to boost
incentives to invest. Experience however suggests that occasionally such reforms take a
long time to bring about the desired eﬀects. The results presented here seem to agree with
this observation. In particular, if such reforms are implemented as a measure for short-run
ﬁscal stimulus of an economy heading towards recession, they are likely to be unsuccessful
in achieving this goal. They also suggest that such reforms are considerably more eﬀective
when they are implemented during a boom. In a sense, appropriate tax cuts can play the14 C. Giannitsarou
role of an insurance policy against future recession. Nevertheless, I should stress that the
results do not suggest that policy makers should refrain from introducing a tax cut during a
recessionary phase: welfare-wise, the agents would still be better oﬀ than if the reform was
not implemented (but not as much as they would be if the policy was implemented during an
expansionary phase), but the eﬀects that policy makers aim for would will not come about
for a long period of time.
7. Conclusion
The present analysis re-examines the transition dynamics of a supply-side reform under the
hypothesis of adaptive learning. I have found that, due to the adjustment inertia of the
agents that learn and the self-referential nature of the model, the transition of the economy
is sensitive to the exogenous shocks and the state of the economy at the time of the reform.
The ﬁndings suggest that capital tax cuts may not be an appropriate instrument for short-
run ﬁscal stimulus of an economy heading towards recession, but it could yield signiﬁcant
short-run beneﬁts if implemented when the economy is booming.
Based on this analysis, I conjecture that the qualitative wedge between transition dynam-
ics under RE and learning is caused neither by the speciﬁcs of the model nor by the speciﬁc
learning algorithm. It seems that the driving force is the inertia of adjustment that would be
present in any economy of learners that undergoes a large structural change. Having isolated
the diﬀerences between the transitions with learning and RE in the framework of a simple
and standard model, it would be interesting to expand the analysis to richer versions the
model, for example variations with agent heterogeneity. This would allow for an examination
of redistributive eﬀects along the lines of Garcia-Milà et al. (1995). Another direction for
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¯ Y ¯ K ¯ C ¯ I ¯ R ¯ W ¯ N ¯ Rnet
old 1.1186 9.6261 0.6341 0.2406 0.0418 2.1478 0.3333 0.01008
new 1.1994 12.3014 0.6999 0.3075 0.0351 2.3706 0.3238 0.01010
Table 1: Steady States
Benchmark Substitution Inelastic labour
Pre-reform REE (0.9576, 0.1221) (0.9576, 0.1221) (0.9743, 0.0585)
Post-reform REE (0.9418, 0.1388) (0.9418, 0.1351) (0.9671, 0.0640)
Table 2: Rational Expectations Equilibria18 C. Giannitsarou
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